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TAX CONSEQUENCES OF SHORTAGES
AND STOCK PURCHASES
WILLIAM H. BAKER*
In the early months of 1974, many Americans began to feel
the effects of the oil boycott imposed on certain Western nations
and the resulting energy crisis. One conspicuous difficulty faced
by many American businesses concerns shortages in the supplies
of vital materials. In order to minimize supply problems during
a period of shortage, companies have joined together in joint ven-
tures' and have even resorted to bartering.2 A widely used tech-
nique is the purchase of stock in a supplier company for the
purpose of insuring a supply of that company's product to the
purchasing company. In many instances, such a stock acquisition
is the only practical means available to the taxpayer for main-
taining a flow of necessary supplies. If business reasons dictate
such an acquisition, the taxpayer should be familiar with the tax
rules which have evolved in this area. The question discussed in
this article is whether stock acquired in this fashion is to be
treated as a capital asset or as an ordinary asset.
The law provides, with certain exceptions,3 that the term
*Professor of Law, DePaul University College of Law; A.B., Duke University; J.D.,
University of Maryland.
1. Hill, More Firms Entering Oil & Gas Business to Assure Own Supply, The Wall
Street Journal, July 15, 1974, at 1, col. 1.
2. Lublin, Many Companies Turn to Bartering as Way to Get Vital Materials, The
Wall Street Journal, Feb. 13, 1974, at 1, col. 1.
3. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1221:
For purposes of this subtitle, the term "capital asset" means property held
by the taxpayer (whether or not connected with his trade or business), but does
not include-
1) stock in trade of the taxpayer or other property of a kind which would properly
be included in the inventory of the taxpayer if on hand at the close of the taxable
year, or property held by the taxpayer primarily for sale to customers in the
ordinary course of his trade or business;
2) property, used in his trade or business, of a character which is subject to the
allowance for depreciation provided in section 167, or real property used in his
trade or business;
3) a copyright, a literary, musical, or artistic composition, a letter or memoran-
dum, or similar property held by -
A) a taxpayer whose personal efforts created such property,
B) in the case of a letter, memorandum, or similar property, a taxpayer
for whom such property was prepared or produced, or
C) a taxpayer in whose hands the basis of such property is determined,
for purposes of determining gain from a sale or exchange, in whole or part
by reference to the basis of such property in the hands of a taxpayer
described in subparagraph (A) or (B);
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"capital asset" means property held by a taxpayer either in a
business or personal context. The exceptions pertain to property
of the taxpayer which constitutes the very items that he custom-
arily buys and sells, such as inventory and property held primar-
ily for sale to customers in the ordinary course of doing business.
Under the prima facie meaning of the statute, stock in a
company purchased by another company would clearly appear to
come within the definition of a capital asset. The statute does not
make special provision for stock purchased for a noninvestment
reason. In fact, the statute gives no consideration to underlying
reasons for which stock may have been acquired. If a taxpayer
company purchased stock in another company for the purpose of
insuring a supply of the second company's product, and if the
purchase of such a stock interest were held to be the purchase of
a capital asset, when the stock was sold, a capital gain or capital
loss would result.
Although the statute contains no exceptions to the definition
of a capital asset which would cover the type of acquisition men-
tioned above, case law has created an exception for stock pur-
chased as an integral part of the business operation of the pur-
chasing company. One of the best known early cases on the sub-
ject, Corn Products Co. v. Commissioner,' involved a company
which manufactured products from grain corn. When droughts
caused a substantial increase in the price of spot corn, the com-
pany found itself in a bind because of its limited storage capacity.
In order to insure itself an adequate supply of corn at an economi-
cal price it adopted a policy of buying corn futures at harvest time
each year when the price seemed favorable. The company would
take delivery of the corn that it needed in its manufacturing
process. The balance of the futures contracts would be sold during
early summer if it did not appear that a shortage would develop
in the near future. The company argued that the futures con-
tracts constituted "property" under § 1221 of the Internal Reve-
nue Code and that the futures were unrelated to the company's
manufacturing process. Accordingly, it argued that the large
4) accounts or notes receivable acquired in the ordinary course of trade or busi-
ness for services rendered or from the sale of property described in paragraph
(1); or
5) an obligation of the United States or any of its possessions, or of a state or
territory, or any political subdivision thereof, or of the District of Columbia,
issued on or after March 1, 1941, on a discount basis and payable without
interest at a fixed maturity date not exceeding one year from the date of issue.
4. 350 U.S. 46 (1955).
[Vol. 27
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gains and smaller losses which resulted from the sale of the fu-
tures should be treated as capital gains and losses.
Referring to § 1221 of the Code, the Supreme Court pointed
out that an exception to the normal tax requirements of the Code
is provided for and, therefore, "the definition of a capital asset
must be narrowly applied and its exclusions interpreted
broadly." 5 The Court conceded that the corn futures did not come
within the literal wording of § 1221 which defines the kind of
property which is excluded from the definition of a capital asset.
Even though the corn futures in Corn Products did not literally
fall within one of the exceptions to the definition of a capital
asset, the Supreme Court decided that capital gain and loss
treatment under § 1221 was intended by Congress to apply only
to transactions which are not the normal source of the taxpayer's
business; it was not intended to apply to transactions resulting
from the day-to-day operations of the business. Testimony of the
company's officers before the Tax Court indicated that the corn
futures were bought as a means of solving a supply and cost
problem relating to an item necessary in the manufacture of its
product.' As a factual matter, the Tax Court and the court of
appeals had concluded that the purchases of corn futures consti-
tuted an "integral part of its manufacturing business."' Accord-
ingly, capital gain and loss treatment was denied to the taxpayer,
even though the corn futures did not specifically come within the
definition of the exclusions listed in § 1221.
Incidental to and Proximately Related to Taxpayer's Business
If the purchase of the stock or security in question by the
taxpayer is viewed as incidental and proximately related to
the taxpayer's business, the cases hold that the stock or security
is not a capital asset. In both Western Wine & Liquor Co. v.
Commissioner8 and Clark v. Commissioner9 the taxpayer ac-
quired stock in the American Distilling Company as a means of
insuring itself a supply of liquor. In 1943, American Distilling
passed a resolution permitting its stockholders to purchase pro
rata amounts of whiskey at book value. A shortage of whiskey
existed at that time and the taxpayers decided that buying stock
5. Id. at 52.
6. Id. at 51.
7. Id. at 50.
8. 18 T.C. 1090, appeal dismissed, 205 F.2d 420 (1952).
9. 19 T.C. 48 (1952).
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in American Distilling was a satisfactory means of maintaining
an adequate supply, thereby permitting the operation of their
businesses in as near a normal manner as possible. After the
purchase rights were exercised, the taxpayers in each case sold
the stock at a loss.
Since the question of the relation between the stock acquisi-
tion and the taxpayer's business operation is one of fact, where a
loss occurs when the stock is sold, the Government is more likely
to view the stock as a capital asset which is unrelated to the
taxpayer's business activities. Significantly, in Western Wine &
Liquor, the court stated that the stock had been acquired "inci-
dent to the conduct of its business and not for investment. '"' The
stock had been sold promptly after the purchase rights had been
exercised. Since the stock had not been acquired as an invest-
ment, but only for the purpose of acquiring whiskey, it was
treated as property primarily held for sale to customers in the
ordinary course of business."
In addition to acquiring stock for the purpose of securing a
source of supply of a particular item, the taxpayer may buy the
stock for the purpose of securing the services of personnel needed
in its operation. If such a purpose for the stock acquisition is
shown, it has been held to be a purpose which is directly related
to the taxpayer's business and hence, the deduction, if there is a
loss, is allowed in full when the stock is sold.'
2
Where an employment situation is involved, the problem
might arise on the part of the individual seeking the job. In
Hirsch v. Commissioner,'3 the plaintiff had spent much of his life
in the home furnishing business. After undergoing surgery, the
taxpayer was precluded from engaging in many activities. He was
offered a position with a particular company; in order to secure
the position, however, he was required to purchase stock in the
company. When he sold the stock at a loss, the court allowed the
loss in full. Referring to the question of proximate relationship,
the court indicated that when comparing the taxpayer's business
with the source of the loss, it is necessary to look at the primary
motivation of the taxpayer. Giving consideration to the extensive
10. 18 T.C. at 1099.
11. See Booth Newspapers, Inc. v. United States, 303 F.2d 916 (Ct. Cl. 1962). But
see Exposition Souvenir Corp. v. Commissioner, 163 F.2d 283 (2d Cir. 1947) which was
one of the cases relied on by the Government in Western Wine & Liquor.
12. Schlumberger Technology Corp. v. United States, 443 F.2d 1115 (5th Cir. 1971).
Chemplast v. Commissioner, 60 T.C. 623 (1973).
13. 30 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1008 (1971).
[Vol. 27
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experience of the taxpayer in the home furnishing field and the
fact that the employment contract referred to the stock pur-
chases, the court concluded that the taxpayer's primary motiva-
tion in buying the stock was merely to secure employment in his
field.
The purchase of stock to protect a position that one already
occupies may also constitute a purpose which is directly con-
nected with a trade or business. In Steadman v. Commissioner,4
the taxpayer was already a stockholder and general counsel of a
company. He purchased additional stock on the premise that by
doing so he would prevent a change in the management of the
company and thereby protect his position as general counsel. The
court, finding that the taxapyer had purchased the stock to pro-
tect his earnings flowing from his position with the company,'-
upheld the taxpayer's deduction.
Acquisition Unrelated to Taxpayer's Trade or Business
The Corn Products case held that corn futures contracts were
not capital assets even though they did not specifically fit into a
definition of one of the exceptions. The reason for the decision
was that the purchase and sale of the futures contracts were inte-
grally related to the taxpayer's trade or business. But Corn
Products did not open the door to anyone conducting a farming
operation to take business losses on commodity futures. In Meade
v. Commissioner,"6 the taxpayer, a farmer, purchased and sold
contracts for corn and cattle futures. He contended that losses
resulting from the sale of the futures contracts were ordinary and
did not result from the sale of capital assets. The taxpayer argued
that the transactions were either true hedges which would effec-
tively place the futures contracts outside the definition of a capi-
tal asset 7 or that the transactions were an integral part of the
business operation of the taxpayer which would bring them
within the Corn Products doctrine. The Tax Court concluded that
14. 424 F.2d 1 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 869 (1970).
15. Compare Hollywood Baseball Ass'n v. Commissioner, 423 F.2d 494 (9th Cir.
1970), (contracts relating to baseball players held to be an integral part of the taxpayer's
business and, therefore, within the Corn Products doctrine), and Pressed Steel Car Co. v.
Commissioner, 20 T.C. 198 (1953) (ordinary loss deduction allowed with respect to stock
purchased to settle claims and relieve itself of a burdensome contract), with Southeastern
Aviation Underwriter, Inc. v. Commissioner, 25 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 412 (1966).
16. 32 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 200 (1973).
17. See United States v. Rogers, 286 F.2d 277 (6th Cir. 1961).
1976]
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there had been no true hedging arrangement. Instead, the court
believed that the taxpayer had acted as a "legitimate capital-
ist,'" speculating in the futures market at the same time he
bought cattle. The court, holding that Corn Products did not
apply to such transactions, observed that the taxpayer's
commodity transaction is not designed to secure a source of
supply while he sells current inventory, for his concomitant ac-
tion in the actual market was to purchase, not sell his stock in
trade. In short, no protective business function whatsoever has
been served.'"
The Meade case demonstrates how close the relationship must be
between the acquisition and the taxpayer's business. Although
the taxpayer was a farmer and the commodity contracts related
to corn and cattle futures, the taxpayer was unable to show a
sufficiently direct connection between the futures transactions
and his farming operation. To insure the success of his farming
operation, it was not necessary to engage in futures transactions
in the manner that he did in order to protect his business.
There is authority for the proposition that the acquisition of
the stock of a new or existing company must be both an integral
and a necessary act in the conduct of the taxpayer's business. In
McCurdy v. United States,0 the taxpayer was arguably in the
business of renting land and equipment to a controlled corpora-
tion. He had spent many years in the Cincinnati area and had
also done business in Indiana, Kentucky and Michigan. He had
never done any business in Florida. The stock in question was
purchased in a Florida corporation. The plan of the Florida corpo-
ration was to build a golf course and to develop a contiguous
residential area. There was no evidence in the case to show a need
which the individual business of the taxpayer had in the stock of
the Florida corporation. Nor was there any apparent relationship
between the stock purchased and a need of the individual busi-
ness. A long-term capital loss was allowed instead of a deduction
under § 16221 of the Code. In the situation where a taxpayer pur-
chases stock in connection with an expansion and there is no
showing that the acquisition related to the perpetuation of an
existing business, the purchase is treated as a capital investment
rather than as a business expense. 2 Where the stock acquisition
18. Meade v. Commissioner, 32 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 200, 210 (1973).
19. Id.
20. 328 F. Supp. 1068 (S.D. Ohio 1971).
21. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 162.
22. Waterman, Largen & Co. v. United States, 419 F.2d 845 (Ct. C1. 1969).
[Vol. 27
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goes beyond alleviating a shortage and, in effect, opens up new
and expanded business opportunites for the taxpayer, it should
be expected that the Government will argue that the stock ac-
quisition went far beyond an attempt to solve a shortage and,
rather, constituted the entry into a new and expanded business.
The investment funds, accordingly, will be categorized as a capi-
tal investment rather than as an expenditure directly related to
furthering the taxpayer's original business.
This argument was made by the Government in Grier v.
United States.2 3 The plaintiff company had always been engaged
in the operation of restaurant businesses and eating places. On
learning that a particular roadside restaurant was for sale, it
began negotiations for its purchase. When negotiations were
nearly concluded, the plaintiff discovered that the restaurant was
owned by a corporation rather than by the individual with whom
negotiations had been conducted. That individual, however, was
the sole stockholder. It was also revealed that the lessor of the
premises was unwilling to agree to an assignment of the lease.
Accordingly, the parties agreed that plaintiff company would
purchase the stock of the restaurant corporation rather than pur-
chase its assets. They believed that such a procedure would make
acquiring the lessor's consent unnecessary. The stock was bought
in 1956 and sold in 1959 at a loss.
The plaintiff company operated the restaurant business in
the same manner it would have operated the business if it had
not been a corporation. The court pointed out that although cor-
porate stock is ordinarily treated as a capital asset, when it is
acquired and retained as an incident to the operation of the tax-
payer's business and not for investment purposes, its sale will
result in ordinary gain or loss. It held that all of the facts indi-
cated that the stock was acquired incident to the taxpayer's busi-
ness and, hence, the loss was treated as an ordinary loss. It is
significant to note, however, that in the Grier case the Govern-
ment made the argument that the operations of the restaurant
were not "closely geared" or "important" to the taxpayer's other
activities. The court, however, indicated that it was not aware of
any cases holding that where a corporation spends considerable
time and effort in a particular activity which is similar although
not exactly like its other activities, such activity will not consti-
tute an "incident" of the corporation's business merely because
23. 216 F. Supp. 928 (M.D. Ill. 1963), affd, 328 F.2d 163 (7th Cir. 1964).
1976]
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it is not "closely geared" or "important" to the other activities
of the corporation.
A corporation acquiring stock in another business might have
less of a problem than an individual would have in trying to show
the required relationship between the stock acquisition and the
business of the taxpayer. Because a corporation is purely a busi-
ness creature, there is a tendency to believe that an interest by
the corporation in different activities is designed to further the
corporation's original business and purpose, unless it is clearly
shown that an investment purpose was present. There may be a
tendency to feel that the scope of a corporation's activities is
broader than that of the average individual so that the individual
may have a somewhat more difficult time in showing that the
acquisition of a new activity was "incident" to his trade or busi-
ness.
24
Corporations often make investments in securities which are
not directly connected with their business activities. Bonds, for
example, might be purchased either as an investment or because
of some business requirement. In Bagley & Sewall Co. v.
Commissionere5 the government of Finland required that the tax-
payer deposit United States Government bonds as the security for
the performance of a contract relating to the manufacture and
delivery of two paper making machines. The Second Circuit held
that the loss on the sale of the bonds was treated as a business
expense rather than a capital loss because the purchase of the
bonds was directly connected with the taxpayer's business and
never would have taken place but for the requirement imposed
on the taxpayer in connection with the contract. If, on the other
hand, a taxpayer purchases bonds on a voluntary basis with pri-
marily an investment motive, the fact that the bonds may be said
to serve a business purpose will not defeat the investment charac-
ter of the expenditure.2
6
24. M.F.A. Cent. Cooperative v. Brookwalter, 427 F.2d 1341 (8th Cir. 1970), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 1045 (1972), where a taxpayer was required to invest in stock of a bank
as a prerequisite to borrowing from the bank and the stock could be disposed of only to
another eligible co-op, and only with permission of the bank. The taxpayer was unable to
show that the purchase of the stock was an ordinary and necessary expense related to its
business; accordingly, it was held to be a capital asset.
25. 221 F.2d 944 (2d Cir. 1955).








As indicated above, in order for the taxpayer to treat th.
purchase of stock as a business expense, the expenditure must be
proximately related to its business and necessary to its operation.
How necessary does it have to be? If the taxpayer could have
remained in business, but less successfully, without making the
expenditure, will it still qualify, under Corn Products, as a non-
capital asset? It might be more appropriate to say that the termi-
nology of § 1221 will be strictly applied unless the taxpayer can
show extremely unusual circumstances which require treating a
purchase of stock, normally a capital asset, as an ordinary busi-
ness item.
In Waterman, Largen & Co. v. United States,17 the taxpayer
was in the business of selling, on a commission basis, yarn made
by various mills. It lost one of its major accounts, became insol-
vent and threatened with the loss of its corporate existence. A
mill located in South Carolina was for sale and the individuals
behind the major account which had been lost agreed to take over
the South Carolina mill. The parties agreed that the taxpayer
could become the exclusive sales agent of the new corporation
running the South Carolina operation if the taxpayer agreed to
purchase $100,000 of the new corporation's stock. Eventually, the
taxpayer sold the stock at a $75,000 loss. Even though the tax-
payer was faced with avoiding liquidation or the dissolution of its
worsted division at the time the stock was purchased, the Govern-
ment argued that the stock had been purchased for the purpose
of expansion of taxpayer's business on a permanent basis. The
court held that the loss should be deducted either under § 162(a)21
or § 165(a)29 of the Code. It termed the expenditure "basically
designed to insure continued life" 3 and stated that the ordinary
and necessary business expense deduction under § 162 should not
be denied merely because there was also the possibility that busi-
ness expansion might result. The Waterman case reaches a sound
result because it seems clear that the taxpayer was in no position
to be investing. It had no excess funds for that purpose and was
struggling to survive.
27. 419 F.2d 845 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
28. See note 21 supra.
29. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 165:
(a) GENERAL RULE - There shall be allowed as a deduction any loss sustained
during the taxable year and not compensated for by insurance or otherwise.
30. 419 F.2d at 853.
1976]
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A purchase of stock in another company which assists the
taxpayer in the operation of its business and is a necessary ex-
penditure should be sufficient to keep the stock from being a
capital asset. In Livesley v. Commissioner,' the taxpayer and her
husband were food brokers, distributors and wholesale dealers
primarily in potatoes and onions. Between 1951 and 1952, de-
mand for potatoes exceeded the supply and, on various occasions,
the taxpayers could not purchase potatoes. In order to protect
themselves against a shortage and also with the possibility of
expansion in mind, the taxpayers bought the stock of a company
which had been a country shipper (bought from farmers and sold
to wholesalers) of potatoes. The Government contended that pur-
chase of the stock was not really required to obtain potatoes. The
facts indicated, however, that the taxpayers had been able to buy
only small amounts of potatoes before they purchased the stock.
After the stock purchase, the taxpayer's purchases from the com-
pany increased substantially.
The court indicated that it was not necessary for the taxpay-
ers to prove that if they had not made the expenditures for the
stock, their partnership would have been ". . . cripplied or would
have failed. Responsible businessmen make legitimate expendi-
tures every day which would not measure up to such a 'survival'
test.""
The decided cases show that taxpayers should expect to be
successful in arguing the stock is not a capital asset if they can
show that the stock acquisition was an ordinary and necessary
expense which was directly related to their trade or business. It
will not be required of them to establish that unless the stock was
purchased they would not have survived as a business. The ap-
31. 19 CCH Tax. Ct. Mem. 133 (1960).
32. Id. at 140. Along lines that the stock acquisition must be a last desperate attempt
by the taxpayer to keep its head above water, before it will be considered a noncapital
asset, the Government argued in Southeastern Aviation Underwriters, Inc. v.
Commissioner, 25 CCH Tax Ct. Rep. 412 (1966), that the taxpayer had not exhausted all
possibilities of obtaining an aviation management contract before it purchased stock in
the company in question which enabled it to obtain a satisfactory aviation insurance
management contract. Prior to the purchase of the stock in question, the taxpayer had
rejected a contract offered by Lloyd's of London which would have greatly changed the
nature of the taxpayer's operations, in the opinion of the court. To have accepted that
contract, in the judgment of the taxpayer, would have been detrimental to the interests
of the taxpayer. According to the court, the evidence also showed that prior to the stock
purchase the taxpayer had made reasonable efforts, though unsuccessful, to secure an
aviation management contract. The court held that the loss resulted from the sale of the
stock in question and was properly deductible as a business expense or an ordinary loss.
[Vol. 27
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proach taken by the courts seems proper; otherwise many ex-
penditures for stock which insured a source of supply of inventory
to a taxpayer or otherwise materially benefitted its day-to-day
operations would be treated as capital in nature, unless some
emergency aspect of the purchase could be shown. Such a result
would unnecessarily hamper the freedom of companies (or other
taxpayers) to make their own business decisions and receive a full
business expense or business loss deduction for an expenditure
which was made without any typical investment motives in mind.
Length of Time Stock Held
Although it is possible for a taxpayer to make an acquisition
of stock and feel confident that because of the business nature of
the purchase an ordinary gain or loss will result when the stock
is sold, it is not only the events surrounding the purchase which
are significant. The purpose for which the stock is actually held,
particularly at the time of its disposition, will also have to satisfy
the business orientation test if the taxpayer is to succeed in classi-
fying the transaction as one involving a noncapital asset. In one
of the early cases33 in which a ruling in favor of the taxpayer on
this issue was made, the court indicated that the taxpayer had
sold the stock as promptly as possible after its purpose had been
accomplished. The taxpayer's purpose was to insure itself a sup-
ply of whiskey; when the whiskey shortage ended, the taxpayer
sold the stock in question. 4
If the taxpayer retains the stock too long after it is no longer
needed to accomplish the business purpose for which it was ac-
quired, the stock will become a capital asset. Perhaps the two
leading cases on this point are Gulftex Drug Co. v.
Commissioner35 and Missisquoi Corp. v. Commissioner .3 These
cases are helpful in at least setting limits on the time the stock
may be safely held after the purpose of its acquisition has been
accomplished. The Gulftex case was one of the "whiskey cases"
where the taxpayer had acquired stock in American Distilling
because of the purchase rights associated with the stock. The
33. Western Wine & Liquor Co. v. Commissioner, 18 T.C. 1090 (1952).
34. See also Enoch v. Commissioner, 57 T.C. 781 (1972), where the bonds in question
were purchased only to meet FHA requirements. The bonds were held not to come within
the definition of a capital asset under § 1221 of the Code, and the court stated: "The bonds
were sold as soon as the FHA loan was repaid and the restrictions were lifted." Id. at 798.
35. 29 T.C. 118 (1957).
36. 37 T.C. 791 (1962).
1976]
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taxpayer retained the stock for a period of 9 years; it did not
dispose of the stock after benefitting from the whiskey purchasing
rights granted by the stock. For the years 1946 through 1952, the
year of sale, dividends were paid with respect to the stock. It is
significant to note that the stock was listed on the New York
Stock Exchange and, therefore, it could have been easily liqui-
dated.
The court pointed out that the purpose of the stock holding
can change in a case of this kind and it is the purpose at the time
of the sale which determines how the transaction will be taxed. 7
The taxpayer was held to have retained the stock as an invest-
ment after receiving the benefits from the whiskey purchasing
rights. The court stated that ". . . when it held the stock beyond
a reasonable time, after exercising the whiskey-purchasing privi-
leges, it deprived itself of the benefit of the type of deduction
allowed in the cases cited and relied upon by it." 8
The Missisquoi case involved a taxpayer who purchased de-
bentures in 1950 for the purpose of insuring itself a supply of
unbleached sulphite pulp which it used in the manufacture of its
product. The business necessity for holding the debentures ended
no later than 1951, but the debentures were not sold until 1955.
The interest paid on the debentures was 3% and during the years
1951-1955 the taxpayer received substantial amounts of interest.
The court conceded that a noninvestment motive had caused the
taxpayer to acquire the debentures in the first instance, even
though the securities had the characteristics of a reasonable in-
vestment. It, nevertheless, pointed out that the taxpayer held the
securities for at least 3 years after the need for unbleached sul-
phite pulp disappeared. Under these circumstances, there was no
longer any reason for treating the debentures as anything other
than capital assets. According to the court, capital gain or loss
treatment will apply unless the securities are disposed of within
"a reasonable time" after the business reason for their acquisition
has ceased to exist. The president of the taxpayer had testified
that beginning in 1952 he had made efforts to sell the debentures,
but the court believed that there had not been "very exhaustive
efforts" made to sell the securities. Retaining the debentures as
an investment, moreover, was consistent with the taxpayer's his-
tory of investing in Government bonds and other securities. It was
also noted that the debentures were carried on the company's
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books as an investment and the gain realized on the redemption
of some of the debentures in 1954 was reported by the taxpayer
as a long-term capital gain. Although none of these factors, if
taken alone, would prove that the taxpayer was holding the secur-
ities for investment purposes, taken together the court treated
them as evidence of an investment purpose which tended to de-
feat the taxpayer's contention that the securities were being held
only until such time as a buyer could be found. 9
How long may the taxpayer wait after he no longer has a
business need for keeping the stock or security in question before
he sells it? Both the Missisquoi and Gulftex cases express the
view that he must dispose of the stock within "a reasonable time"
after the business need ceases. How long is a "reasonable time"
when someone is attempting to sell a security? In Booth Newspa-
pers, Inc., v. United States,"0 it took the taxpayer seven months
to find a buyer for the stock and negotiate a sale. That period of
time was not sufficient to convert the stock into a capital asset
held for investment purposes. In Booth Newspapers, the stock
owned in Michigan Paper Co. was not a listed stock, and the
taxpayer relied on a firm of consulting engineers to find a pur-
chaser. The decision to sell the stock in that case was made in
July, 1953; negotiations for the sale began in the fall of 1953; the
stock was actually sold in February, 1954. Had the stock in ques-
tion been listed on the New York Stock Exchange, however, the
court might have regarded its retention for seven months after the
need for it had ended as effectively converting it into a capital
asset. In that situation, because the stock could be readily sold,
it would appear that the only logical explanation for retaining it
was that the taxpayer wanted to hold it as an investment."
The facts and circumstances of each case will no doubt con-
trol in reaching a determination of whether or not a taxpayer
waited too long to effect the sale of securities. If there are no
impediments to a sale, it would seem that a taxpayer would be
39. It has been held that the manner in which an asset is carried on the taxpayer's
books is not conclusive. Smith & Welton, Inc. v. United States, 164 F. Supp. 605 (E.D.
Va. 1958); Tulane Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Commissioner, 24 T.C. 1146 (1955).
40. 303 F.2d 916 (Ct. Cl. 1962).
41. In Missisquoi Corp. v. Commissioner, 37 T.C. 791 (1962), the Tax Court expressed
its opinion with respect to the dangers inherent in holding readily salable stock or securi-
ties until a better price can be obtained: "While it may have been a sounder business
tactic to hold these debentures until a better price could be obtained for them rather than
to dump them at a loss within a reasonable time after the necessity for holding them
ceased, we do not think this is the kind of business activity which permits ignoring the
capital gains and loss provisions." Id. at 798.
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running a substantial risk in holding the stock longer than even
several months, unless unusual facts would justify such a holding.
Such unusual facts were present in FS Services, Inc. v. United
States." There, the taxpayer was a wholesaler of petroleum prod-
ucts and, because of supply problems, it became necessary for the
taxpayer to acquire an interest in five refineries. The interest was
acquired by a newly formed company, Premier Petroleum, the
stock of which was purchased by the taxpayer and two other
cooperatives in 1948. When the shortage ended the stock in Pre-
mier Petroleum was sold; the sale, however, took place seven
years after the need for the stock ended. The court held that the
acquisition had been based on valid business considerations and
that there was no intent to make a capital investment. The Gov-
ernment relied on Gulftex and Missisquoi in arguing that at some
time before the sale of the stock the original business purpose of
the taxpayers changed to an investment purpose.
Despite the lapse of seven years after the shortage ended and
before the stock was sold, the court held that the taxpayer could
take an ordinary loss deduction. It pointed out that in Gulftex the
stock was listed on the New York Stock Exchange and was readily
salable. In the instant case, the stock was unlisted and had little
marketability. The taxpayer had always shown a willingness and
a desire to sell the stock and it made every reasonable effort to
dispose of it. Under these circumstances, there was no conversion
of the stock into a capital asset.
Factors Showing Investment Purpose
The purpose of the taxpayer is to acquire the inventory
within a particular period of time. The purpose for which the
stock was acquired was one which could be accomplished within
a relatively short period of time.
It seems logical that the more stock a taxpayer acquires in
another company, the greater an investment purpose he has. The
Internal Revenue Service would be expected to argue that a tax-
payer should acquire only enough stock to insure itself a source
of inventory or to otherwise accomplish his business purpose. 3
The percentage of stock ownership acquired is probably still a
factor to consider in deciding whether or not an investment pur-
pose is present but, since the ruling was issued, case law has not
42. 413 F.2d 548 (Ct. C1. 1969).
43. Rev. Rul. 58-40, 1958 Cum. BULL. 275.
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found that factor to be controlling.4' In Booth Newspapers, the
two taxpayers involved purchased all of the stock of Michigan
Paper Co., but they, nevertheless, were successful in showing that
the stock was not a capital asset.
A case which was distinguished from Booth Newspapers and
which clearly shows one situation where an investment purpose
would result is Duffey v. Lethert.4' The taxpayer company in that
case was a jobber in the paper business but did not manufacture
any of its own paper. In 1957, the taxpayer paid $10,000 to Educa-
tional Institute of Industry, Inc., for 500 shares of common stock
and 50 shares of preferred stock in the Institute. The Institute had
been formed to conduct research and studies in industry and for
the purpose of developing and publishing surveys. In buying the
stock, the taxpayer was not motivated by the thought of receiving
dividend income. It was motivated by the thought of receiving
profit on additional sales of paper to Harrison and Smith Com-
pany, one of the organizers of the Institute. The taxpayer, how-
ever, made practically no sales as a result of its stock acquisition.
In 1959, the taxpayer sold its stock back to the Institute for only
a fraction of what it had paid. Later, the Institute discontinued
its operation.
The Court in Duffey referred to Booth Newspapers as being
a very different kind of a case, since, in Booth, there was a short-
age of newsprint which was essential to the taxpayer's operation.
The stock in the paper company was acquired to secure a source
of supply of newsprint, a purpose directly related to the business
of the taxpayers. In Duffey, the taxpayer was not a struggling
taxpayer which needed the business benefit it thought might re-
sult from the acquisition of stock in the Institute. In fact, the
Institute, through Harrison and Smith, purchased only a small
amount of paper, but the taxpayer still had a taxable income of
$190,000 for the year 1958. The court stated that "[ilt is con-
ceded that the stock purchase may have been a desirable one or
even a reasonable one (if expansion of sales was desired) but it
does not follow that the purchase was ordinary and necessary."46
The court then went on to state the key difference between the
two cases:
There is a lot of difference in buying a source of supply of paper
to keep from going out of business and buying stock in a new
44. Booth Newspapers, Inc. v. United States, 303 F.2d 916 (Ct. C1. 1962).
45. 63-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 88,182 (D.C. Minn. 1963).
46. Id. at 88,191.
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and totally unproved company in an effort to increase sales. The
former case is one of a necessary expenditure; the latter a specu-
lative one. It does not matter that the gain to be derived took
the form of profit on Duffey Company sales rather than dividend
income from the Institute."
The investment purpose in Duffey is found in the taxpayer's
absence of need to acquire the stock and also in the nature of the
company in which the ownership interest was acquired. The
Institute was a new organization which was formed as a new
venture; its stock was acquired primarily with a view toward
future gain rather than to solve any immediate business problem
of the taxpayer.
The way in which a transaction is treated on the books of the
taxpayer may have some bearing on how the transaction will be
treated. In one case," the taxpayer was required to purchase stock
in another company in order to secure springs at O.P.A. ceiling
prices which it needed in the manufacture of furniture. The
springs were treated on the taxpayer's books as part of the inven-
tory for cost purposes. The stock was entered on the taxpayer's
books in an account titled "securities." The stock was sold back
to the company from which it was purchased in the year after
purchase. The court refused to treat the stock as part of the cost
of goods sold. It indicated that the record failed to show that the
purchase and sale of the stock were anything other than what
they appeared to be.4" The decision was not based on the way the
stock had been classified by the taxpayer, but it appears that the
classification was one factor which influenced the decision.
In Tulane Hardwood Lumber Co. v. Commissioner,"0 the fact
that the taxpayer had entered the debentures in question on its
books as an investment and had received interest on the deben-
tures was a consideration referred to by the court on the question
of investment versus business expense. In that case, however,
those factors were not sufficient to overcome other facts in the
case indicating the business nature of the debenture acquisition.
In Journal Co. v. United States,5' the taxpayer was suc-
cessful on this issue even though it had almost $20,000 in divi-
dends over four years from its stock acquisition and the transac-
47. Id.
48. McGhee Upholstery Co. v. Commissioner, 12 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1455 (1953).
49. Id. at 1456.
50. 24 T.C. 1146 (1955).
51. 195 F. Supp. 434 (E.D. Wis. 1961).
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tion had been shown in the taxpayer's records under an account
labelled "Investments Special." The court in that case com-
mented in detail on the effect of an entry in the taxpayer's books.
It treated the entry as being competent evidence on the question
of intent behind the stock transaction. It went on to state, how-
ever, that the entry had not properly reflected the nature of the
transaction and the taxpayer could be permitted to show by other
evidence the true intent of the transaction. Referring to the termi-
nology used by the taxpayer in its own records, the court noted
that "[t]his choice is not conclusive on the question of intent
where the record clearly indicates that the Journal bought, re-
tained, and sold the stock in order to secure a source of news-
print."52
Viewing the cases which have commented on the effect of the
terminology used by the taxpayer in its books and on other factors
such as the receipt of dividend or interest income with respect to
the security, one is drawn to the conclusion that these facts come
into prominence only if the taxpayer is unable to show by other
evidence the business nature of the acquisition. If the facts will
not justify a conclusion that the transaction was business ori-
ented, then the court will more than likely refer to the taxpayer's
own classification 3 (where the taxpayer termed it an investment)
and the receipt of income with respect to the securities to support
a decision against the taxpayer.
Treatment by Taxpayer
The cases involving the tax treatment available to the tax-
payer who acquires stock for a business purpose have been neither
precise nor consistent in describing the manner in which the tax-
payer should report the transaction for this reason. It may be
useful to refer to the various possibilities and some of the cases
which are authority for each.
We might first consider the case where a taxpayer acquires
stock in a company to insure himself a supply of inventory. When
the inventory is sold, the taxpayer will realize ordinary income.
52. Id. at 438.
53. Listing securities as an investment by a taxpayer on its books, income produced
by the securities while they are held, the fact that the purchaser had other investments,
and whether or not there was a ready market for the securities have been referred to as
"other indicators of intent." Troxell & Noall, Judicial Erosion of the Concept of Securi-
ties as Capital Assets, 19 TAx L. REv. 185, 203-4. The authors of that article take the
position that of the four "other" indicators stated, only the indicator of a ready market
for the security is significant.
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Assume that he paid $10,000 for the stock in question and he
retains it for two years, or just long enough to accomplish his
purpose. He then sells the stock for $5,000. Where the stock is sold
for less than its basis, it has been held that the difference between
the sales price and the basis may be deducted as an ordinary and
necessary business expense. 4
Where the stock becomes worthless, it has been held that an
ordinary loss results in the amount of the purchase price of the
stock. In Steadman v. Commissioner,;5 the taxpayer purchased
the stock to protect his position as general counsel with a com-
pany and, accordingly, the stock was not treated as a capital
asset. If it has been treated as a capital asset as is the usual
situation in the case of stock, then the loss would have been
limited to capital loss treatment." Since the stock was not treated
as a capital asset, the loss was simply deductible as a business
loss."
In the whiskey supply cases,5" the courts added the loss re-
sulting from the sale of the stock to the cost of goods sold. This
means that the loss would be added to the cost basis of the liquor
which was acquired and would have the effect of reducing the
profit on the liquor when it is sold. Since the liquor results in
ordinary income when sold, this type of adjustment would reduce
the amount of income subject to ordinary income tax rates and
have the same effect as the allowance of a business expense or a
business loss. The Government viewed the entire transaction as
being made up of two parts-one, an acquisition of liquor and
two, an acquisition of stock. The Government then argued that
the separate stock purchase and sale gave rise to a short term
capital loss. Viewing the transaction in this manner, the Govern-
54. Hogg v. Allen, 105 F. Supp. 12 (D.C. Ga. 1952); Bagley & Sewall Co. v. Commis-
sioner, 20 T.C. 983 (1953). The Bagley & Sewall case is somewhat different from the usual
inventory case because the taxpayer was required to purchase United States Government
bonds to secure the performance of a contract. The factual difference from the inventory
cases is not significant, however, in deciding how to treat the disposition of the bonds.
When the bonds were disposed of at a loss, the loss was treated as an ordipary and
necessary business expense.
55. 424 F.2d 1 (6th Cir. 1970).
56. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 165(g):
(1) GENERA.L RuLE - If any security which is a capital asset becomes worthless
during the taxable year, the loss resulting therefrom shall, for purposes of this
subtitle, be treated as a loss from the sale or exchange, on the last day of the
taxable year, of a capital asset.
57. Id. § 165(a).
58. Clark v. Commissioner, 19 T.C. 48 (1952); Western Wine & Liquor Co. v. Com-
missioner, 18 T.C. 1090 (1952).
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ment then contended that the cost basis of the liquor was only
the amount actually paid for the liquor. Accordingly, when the
liquor was sold, a larger gain would result than would be the case
if the cost basis of the liquor were increased by the amount of the
loss on the sale of the stock.
This cost of goods sold theory may be troublesome where the
stock is sold in a year after the inventory or other property is
sold. 9 Let us assume that the stock is acquired in the first year
for the purpose of securing certain needed inventory. After the
inventory is acquired, it does not sell, and eventually, in the
second year, the taxpayer sells the stock at a price lower than was
paid for it. If the cost of goods sold theory is used, would the loss
on the stock be added to the cost of goods acquired in the second
year (it may be that no goods were even acquired in that year) or
must the loss be added to the cost of goods sold in the first year?
If that is the case, it would be necessary for the taxpayer to file
an amended return or claim for refund for the first year.
The Government's position prevailed in McGhee Upholstery
Co. v. Commissioner."° There, the taxpayer purchased the stock
of another company in 1946 in order to secure springs which were
needed to manufacture furniture. A loss resulted from the sale of
the stock in the year following the acquisition of the stock and
springs. The court upheld the Government's position and held
that the stock was simply a capital asset which gave rise to a
capital loss when it was sold. It went on to state, however, that
"[e]ven if it had been concluded that the purchase of the shares
was to be treated as a part of the cost of goods, it was a purchase
in 1946 and not in 1947, and any attempt to treat the loss either
as cost of goods purchased in 1947 or an operating loss in that year
would be clearly wrong.""1 It is difficult to follow the court's rea-
soning that an operating loss would be improper in 1947. Since
the sale of stock actually occurred in 1947, that would appear to
be the proper year for the operating loss, if one were to use the
"loss theory" rather than the cost of goods sold theory. In any
event, it seems clear that the cost of goods sold theory can cause
problems with respect to the proper year to report the transac-
tion. Because the amount of the loss cannot be determined until
the stock is disposed of, it is strained to term the amount of the
loss as a part of the cost of goods sold. Ordinarily, cost of goods
59. See Holzman, Tie-in Purchases-Buyer's Loss on Resale, 34 TAXEs 411 (1956).
60. 12 CCH Tax Ct. Mem. 1455 (1953).
61. Id. at 1456.
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sold items will represent expenditures made at or close to the
time when the goods are actually acquired or in a transaction
directly connected with their acquisition. Where the taxpayer
must wait a substantial period of time (perhaps years) before he
can ascertain the amount of his loss, it is difficult to think of the
loss as a cost of goods sold item, particularly with reference to
goods purchased years before.
It is possible that the expenditure for stock can be deducted
as interest under § 163. In Penn Yan Agway Cooperative, Inc. v.
United States," the taxpayer was a farmers' purchasing coopera-
tive and, as a condition to borrowing money from a bank, it was
required to purchase certain stock from the lender bank on a
quarterly basis. Taxpayer sought to deduct, either as interest
under § 163 of the Internal Revenue Code or as an ordinary and
necessary business expense under § 162 of the Code, the amount
by which its payment for the stock exceeded its fair market value.
The Government argued that the stock represented a capital in-
vestment and that there had been no disposition of the asset
which would give rise to a capital loss. 3
The court held that the amount in controversy represented
interest which could be deducted as such under § 163. It reached
that result ". . particularly because the amount of such stock
required to be purchased by law and by the loan agreements
involved was measured by a percentage of the interest payable on
plaintiff's outstanding loan obligations to the bank issuing the
stock."64
A final possibility is for the sum paid for the stock in question
to be treated as an investment and for future additional amounts
paid to the supplier company, for example, to be treated as addi-
tional contributions to the capital of the company, rather than
part of the cost of goods sold. There is authority in cases involving
payments made over and above O.P.A. ceiling prices65 that the
62. 417 F.2d 1372 (Ct. Cl. 1969).
63. Id. at 1373.
64. Id. at 1382. In M.F.A. Cent. Cooperative v. Bookwalter, 427 F.2d 1341 (8th Cir.
1970), where it was found that the taxpayer received stock for the "additional money"
paid, the purchase price of the stock was held not to be interest and was not treated as a
deductible ordinary and necessary business expense. The interest concept did not appeal
to the court because the stock was not considered by the parties to be payments for the
use of money. The stock, which had not been sold or exchanged, was treated as a capital
asset under § 1221. In addition, the court indicated that the stock had not become worth-
less and therefore § 165 did not apply.
65. Sullenger v. Commissioner, 11 T.C. 1076 (1948); Young v. Commissioner, 11 CCH
Tax Ct. Mem. 863 (1952).
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excess amount paid should be treated as part of the cost of goods
sold. But additional contributions were held to be contributions
of capital6 where a taxpayer was required to purchase stock of a
meat supplier and then make additional payments to insure a
supply of meat. Had all of the additional payments been treated
as part of the cost of goods sold, the cost of such goods would have
risen above the price permitted by law and the taxpayer would
have been in the position of having made illegal payments. The
court was reluctant to attribute such conduct to the taxpayer.
Conclusion
Although the statute defining a "capital asset"67 seems to
provide a clear definition and even specifies exceptions which fall
outside of the general definition, courts have added their own
exception in the case of a purchase of securities (normally a capi-
tal asset) which is directly related to the operation of the busi-
ness. Many uncertainties exist in this area: Will the initial stock
purchase be treated as made for investment or business purposes?
What type of "business purpose" will satisfy the court-made ex-
ception to the definition of a capital asset? How quickly must the
stock be sold after the business purpose of its acquisition ceases
to exist? One writer has suggested that many of the problems in
this area could be solved by establishing objective guides for
applying the Corn Products doctrine, by requiring a taxpayer to
make an irrevocable election to treat the stock as non-capital at
the time he acquires it (an election which would not, however, be
binding on the Commissioner) and by setting a time limit on how
long an asset may be held in order to qualify under the non-
capital asset category.68 It would appear impractical and undesir-
able for Congress to attempt to legislate an answer to these prob-
lems. The key question involved is essentially factual in nature,
and it is no more difficult to resolve than other factual problems
presented by the Internal Revenue Code. For example, the ques-
tion of whether or not a particular asset is held "primarily for sale
to customers in the ordinary course of his trade or business" 9 is
a factual question which courts constantly contend with in deter-
mining the capital gain or loss versus ordinary income question.
Resolving the instant problem involves the same kind of consider-
66. Sackstein v. Commissioner, 14 T.C. 566 (1950).
67. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1221.
68. Kauffman, A Second Look at the Corn Products Doctrine, 41 TAXES 605 (1963).
69. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 1221(1).
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ations and is no more difficult. The establishment of rigid rules
in this area could have the effect of restricting the activities of
companies and other taxpayers particularly in times of shortages,
when the ability to choose any logical means of satisfying a sup-
ply problem should be available. In cases where non-capital asset
status is permitted, the tendency of recent cases seems to be to
treat the loss as a business expense or business loss, rather than
as part of the cost of goods sold. Business loss treatment seems
most appropriate because an asset has been disposed of. That
treatment also clearly fixes the year of loss. Although the area
presents difficulties, the courts have taken a fair approach to the
issue and, if taxpayers understand the many cases which have
been decided in taxpayers' favor, they should have a reasonably
clear picture of what might be expected when they acquire a
security to alleviate a shortage in order to give that security a
non-capital asset status.
22
South Carolina Law Review, Vol. 27, Iss. 4 [1976], Art. 8
https://scholarcommons.sc.edu/sclr/vol27/iss4/8
